Dragonfly 2.0 is a suspected Russian group that has targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at least December 2015. [1] [2] There is debate over the extent of overlap between Dragonfly 2.0 and Dragonfly, but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. [3][4]
Name | Description |
---|---|
IRON LIBERTY | |
DYMALLOY | |
Berserk Bear |
Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Enterprise | T1087 | .002 | Account Discovery: Domain Account |
Dragonfly 2.0 used batch scripts to enumerate users on a victim domain controller.[1] |
Enterprise | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Dragonfly 2.0 added newly created accounts to the administrators group to maintain elevated access.[1][7] |
|
Enterprise | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol |
Dragonfly 2.0 used SMB for C2.[1] |
|
Enterprise | T1560 | Archive Collected Data |
Dragonfly 2.0 compressed data into .zip files prior to exfiltrating it.[1] |
|
Enterprise | T1547 | .001 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
Dragonfly 2.0 added the registry value ntdll to the Registry Run key to establish persistence.[1] |
.009 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Shortcut Modification |
Dragonfly 2.0 manipulated .lnk files to gather user credentials in conjunction with Forced Authentication.[1] |
||
Enterprise | T1110 | .002 | Brute Force: Password Cracking |
Dragonfly 2.0 dropped and executed tools used for password cracking, including Hydra and CrackMapExec.[1][7][8] |
Enterprise | T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter |
Dragonfly 2.0 used command line for execution.[1] |
|
.001 | PowerShell |
Dragonfly 2.0 used PowerShell scripts for execution.[1][2][7] |
||
.003 | Windows Command Shell |
Dragonfly 2.0 used various types of scripting to perform operations, including batch scripts.[1][7] |
||
.006 | Python |
Dragonfly 2.0 used various types of scripting to perform operations, including Python scripts. The group was observed installing Python 2.7 on a victim.[1][7] |
||
Enterprise | T1136 | .001 | Create Account: Local Account |
Dragonfly 2.0 created accounts on victims, including administrator accounts, some of which appeared to be tailored to each individual staging target.[1][7] |
Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System |
Dragonfly 2.0 collected data from local victim systems.[1] |
|
Enterprise | T1074 | .001 | Data Staged: Local Data Staging |
Dragonfly 2.0 created a directory named "out" in the user's %AppData% folder and copied files to it.[1] |
Enterprise | T1189 | Drive-by Compromise |
Dragonfly 2.0 compromised legitimate organizations' websites to create watering holes to compromise victims.[1] |
|
Enterprise | T1114 | .002 | Email Collection: Remote Email Collection |
Dragonfly 2.0 accessed email accounts using Outlook Web Access.[7] |
Enterprise | T1133 | External Remote Services |
Dragonfly 2.0 used VPNs and Outlook Web Access (OWA) to maintain access to victim networks.[1][7] |
|
Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery |
Dragonfly 2.0 used a batch script to gather folder and file names from victim hosts.[1] |
|
Enterprise | T1187 | Forced Authentication |
Dragonfly 2.0 has gathered hashed user credentials over SMB using spearphishing attachments with external resource links and by modifying .LNK file icon resources to collect credentials from virtualized systems.[1][7] |
|
Enterprise | T1564 | .002 | Hide Artifacts: Hidden Users |
Dragonfly 2.0 modified the Registry to hide create user accounts. [1] |
Enterprise | T1562 | .004 | Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall |
Dragonfly 2.0 has disabled host-based firewalls. The group has also globally opened port 3389.[1][7] |
Enterprise | T1070 | .001 | Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Windows Event Logs |
Dragonfly 2.0 cleared Windows event logs and other logs produced by tools they used, including system, security, terminal services, remote services, and audit logs. The actors also deleted specific Registry keys.[1][7] |
.004 | Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion |
Dragonfly 2.0 deleted many of its files used during operations as part of cleanup, including removing applications and deleting screenshots.[1][7] |
||
Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer |
Dragonfly 2.0 copied and installed tools for operations once in the victim environment.[1][7] |
|
Enterprise | T1036 | Masquerading |
Dragonfly 2.0 created accounts disguised as legitimate backup and service accounts as well as an email administration account.[1][7] |
|
Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry |
Dragonfly 2.0 modified the Registry to perform multiple techniques through the use of Reg.[1] |
|
Enterprise | T1135 | Network Share Discovery |
Dragonfly 2.0 identified and browsed file servers in the victim network, sometimes , viewing files pertaining to ICS or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.[1][7] |
|
Enterprise | T1003 | .002 | OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager |
Dragonfly 2.0 dropped and executed SecretsDump to dump password hashes.[1][7] |
.003 | OS Credential Dumping: NTDS |
Dragonfly 2.0 dropped and executed SecretsDump to dump password hashes. They also obtained ntds.dit from domain controllers. [1][7][9] |
||
.004 | OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets |
Dragonfly 2.0 dropped and executed SecretsDump to dump password hashes.[1][7][9] |
||
Enterprise | T1069 | .002 | Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups |
Dragonfly 2.0 used batch scripts to enumerate administrators and users in the domain.[1] |
Enterprise | T1566 | .001 | Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment |
Dragonfly 2.0 used spearphishing with Microsoft Office attachments to target victims.[1][7] |
.002 | Phishing: Spearphishing Link |
Dragonfly 2.0 used spearphishing with PDF attachments containing malicious links that redirected to credential harvesting websites.[1] |
||
Enterprise | T1012 | Query Registry |
Dragonfly 2.0 queried the Registry to identify victim information.[1] |
|
Enterprise | T1021 | .001 | Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol |
Dragonfly 2.0 moved laterally via RDP.[1][7] |
Enterprise | T1018 | Remote System Discovery |
Dragonfly 2.0 likely obtained a list of hosts in the victim environment.[1] |
|
Enterprise | T1053 | .005 | Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task |
Dragonfly 2.0 used scheduled tasks to automatically log out of created accounts every 8 hours as well as to execute malicious files.[1][7] |
Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture |
Dragonfly 2.0 has performed screen captures of victims, including by using a tool, scr.exe (which matched the hash of ScreenUtil).[1][2] |
|
Enterprise | T1505 | .003 | Server Software Component: Web Shell |
Dragonfly 2.0 commonly created Web shells on victims' publicly accessible email and web servers, which they used to maintain access to a victim network and download additional malicious files.[1][7] |
Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery |
Dragonfly 2.0 used batch scripts to enumerate network information, including information about trusts, zones, and the domain.[1] |
|
Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery |
Dragonfly 2.0 used the command |
|
Enterprise | T1221 | Template Injection |
Dragonfly 2.0 has injected SMB URLs into malicious Word spearphishing attachments to initiate Forced Authentication.[1][7] |
|
Enterprise | T1204 | .001 | User Execution: Malicious Link |
Dragonfly 2.0 has used various forms of spearphishing in attempts to get users to open links.[1][7] |
.002 | User Execution: Malicious File |
Dragonfly 2.0 has used various forms of spearphishing in attempts to get users to open attachments.[1][7] |
||
Enterprise | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Dragonfly 2.0 compromised user credentials and used valid accounts for operations.[1] |