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Broadcast Receivers

An intent is a message passed between Android application or system components. Applications can register to receive broadcast intents at runtime, which are system-wide intents delivered to each app when certain events happen on the device, such as network changes or the user unlocking the screen. Malicious applications can then trigger certain actions within the app based on which broadcast intent was received.

Further, malicious applications can register for intents broadcasted by other applications in addition to the Android system itself. This allows the malware to respond based on actions in other applications. This behavior typically indicates a more intimate knowledge, or potentially the targeting of specific devices, users, or applications.

In Android 8 (API level 26), broadcast intent behavior was changed, limiting the implicit intents that applications can register for in the manifest. In most cases, applications that register through the manifest will no longer receive the broadcasts. Now, applications must register context-specific broadcast receivers while the user is actively using the app.[1]

ID: T1402
Sub-techniques:  No sub-techniques
Tactic Type: Post-Adversary Device Access
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Tactics: Persistence, Execution
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Platforms: Android
Contributors: Alex Hinchliffe, Palo Alto Networks
Version: 2.0
Created: 25 October 2017
Last Modified: 27 March 2020
Provided by LAYER 8

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0525 Android/AdDisplay.Ashas

Android/AdDisplay.Ashas has registered to receive the BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast intent to activate on device startup.[2]
S0524 AndroidOS/MalLocker.B

AndroidOS/MalLocker.B has registered to receive 14 different broadcast intents for automatically triggering malware payloads. [3]
S0479 DEFENSOR ID

DEFENSOR ID abuses the accessibility service to auto-start the malware on device boot. This is accomplished by receiving the android.accessibilityservice.AccessibilityService intent.[4]
S0478 EventBot

EventBot registers for the BOOT_COMPLETED intent to auto-start after the device boots.[5]
S0522 Exobot

Exobot has registered to receive the BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast intent.[6]
S0509 FakeSpy

FakeSpy can register for the BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast Intent.[7]
S0408 FlexiSpy

FlexiSpy uses root access to establish reboot hooks to re-install the application from /data/misc/adn.[8] At boot, FlexiSpy spawns daemons for process monitoring, call monitoring, call managing, and system.[8]
S0421 GolfSpy

GolfSpy registers for the USER_PRESENT broadcast intent and uses it as a trigger to take photos with the front-facing camera.[9]
S0536 GPlayed

GPlayed can register for the BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast intent.[10]
S0544 HenBox

HenBox has registered several broadcast receivers.[11]
S0316 Pegasus for Android

Pegasus for Android listens for the BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast intent in order to maintain persistence and activate its functionality at device boot time.[12]
S0419 SimBad

SimBad registers for the BOOT_COMPLETED and USER_PRESENT broadcast intents, which allows the software to perform actions after the device is booted and when the user is using the device, respectively.[13]
S0324 SpyDealer

SpyDealer registers the broadcast receiver to listen for events related to device boot-up.[14]
S0305 SpyNote RAT

SpyNote RAT uses an Android broadcast receiver to automatically start when the device boots.[15]
S0545 TERRACOTTA

TERRACOTTA has registered several broadcast receivers.[16]
S0558 Tiktok Pro

Tiktok Pro has registered for device boot, incoming, and outgoing calls broadcast intents.[17]
S0427 TrickMo

TrickMo registers for the SCREEN_ON and SMS_DELIVER intents to perform actions when the device is unlocked and when the device receives an SMS message.[18]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1006 Use Recent OS Version

In Android 8, broadcast intent behavior was changed, limiting the implicit intents that applications can register for in the manifest.[1]

Detection

Broadcast intent receivers are part of standard OS-level APIs and are therefore typically undetectable to the end user.

References

  1. Google. (2019, December 27). Broadcasts Overview. Retrieved January 27, 2020.
  2. L. Stefanko. (2019, October 24). Tracking down the developer of Android adware affecting millions of users. Retrieved October 29, 2020.
  3. D. Venkatesan. (2020, October 8). Sophisticated new Android malware marks the latest evolution of mobile ransomware . Retrieved October 29, 2020.
  4. L. Stefanko. (2020, May 22). Insidious Android malware gives up all malicious features but one to gain stealth. Retrieved June 26, 2020.
  5. D. Frank, L. Rochberger, Y. Rimmer, A. Dahan. (2020, April 30). EventBot: A New Mobile Banking Trojan is Born. Retrieved June 26, 2020.
  6. Threat Fabric. (2017, February). Exobot - Android banking Trojan on the rise. Retrieved October 29, 2020.
  7. O. Almkias. (2020, July 1). FakeSpy Masquerades as Postal Service Apps Around the World. Retrieved September 15, 2020.
  8. K. Lu. (n.d.). Deep Technical Analysis of the Spyware FlexiSpy for Android. Retrieved September 10, 2019.
  9. E. Xu, G. Guo. (2019, June 28). Mobile Cyberespionage Campaign ‘Bouncing Golf’ Affects Middle East. Retrieved January 27, 2020.
  1. V. Ventura. (2018, October 11). GPlayed Trojan - .Net playing with Google Market . Retrieved November 24, 2020.
  2. A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.
  3. Mike Murray. (2017, April 3). Pegasus for Android: the other side of the story emerges. Retrieved April 16, 2017.
  4. Elena Root, Andrey Polkovnichenko. (2019, March 13). SimBad: A Rogue Adware Campaign On Google Play. Retrieved November 21, 2019.
  5. Wenjun Hu, Cong Zheng and Zhi Xu. (2017, July 6). SpyDealer: Android Trojan Spying on More Than 40 Apps. Retrieved September 18, 2018.
  6. Shivang Desai. (2017, January 23). SpyNote RAT posing as Netflix app. Retrieved January 26, 2017.
  7. Satori Threat Intelligence and Research Team. (2020, August). TERRACOTTA Android Malware: A Technical Study. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
  8. S. Desai. (2020, September 8). TikTok Spyware. Retrieved January 5, 2021.
  9. P. Asinovsky. (2020, March 24). TrickBot Pushing a 2FA Bypass App to Bank Customers in Germany. Retrieved April 24, 2020.