OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory

Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct Lateral Movement using Use Alternate Authentication Material.

As well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.

For example, on the target host use procdump:

  • procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump

Locally, mimikatz can be run using:

  • sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp
  • sekurlsa::logonPasswords

Built-in Windows tools such as comsvcs.dll can also be used:

  • rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp full[1][2]

Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSSAS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.[3]

The following SSPs can be used to access credentials:

  • Msv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.
  • Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges.[4]
  • Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.
  • CredSSP: Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.[4]
ID: T1003.001
Sub-technique of:  T1003
Platforms: Windows
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Contributors: Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs; Edward Millington
Version: 1.1
Created: 11 February 2020
Last Modified: 15 October 2021
Provided by LAYER 8

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0006 APT1

APT1 has been known to use credential dumping using Mimikatz.[5]

G0007 APT28

APT28 regularly deploys both publicly available (ex: Mimikatz) and custom password retrieval tools on victims.[6][7] They have also dumped the LSASS process memory using the MiniDump function.[8]

G0022 APT3

APT3 has used a tool to dump credentials by injecting itself into lsass.exe and triggering with the argument "dig."[9]

G0050 APT32

APT32 used Mimikatz and customized versions of Windows Credential Dumper to harvest credentials.[10][11]

G0064 APT33

APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne, Mimikatz, and ProcDump to dump credentials.[12][13]

G0087 APT39

APT39 has used Mimikatz, Windows Credential Editor and ProcDump to dump credentials.[14]

G0096 APT41

APT41 has used hashdump, Mimikatz, and the Windows Credential Editor to dump password hashes from memory and authenticate to other user accounts.[15][16]

S0606 Bad Rabbit

Bad Rabbit has used Mimikatz to harvest credentials from the victim's machine.[17]

G0108 Blue Mockingbird

Blue Mockingbird has used Mimikatz to retrieve credentials from LSASS memory.[18]


BRONZE BUTLER has used various tools (such as Mimikatz and WCE) to perform credential dumping.[19]

G0003 Cleaver

Cleaver has been known to dump credentials using Mimikatz and Windows Credential Editor.[20]

S0154 Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike can spawn a job to inject into LSASS memory and dump password hashes.[21]

S0046 CozyCar

CozyCar has executed Mimikatz to harvest stored credentials from the victim and further victim penetration.[22]

S0187 Daserf

Daserf leverages Mimikatz and Windows Credential Editor to steal credentials.[23]

S0367 Emotet

Emotet has been observed dropping password grabber modules including Mimikatz. [24]

S0363 Empire

Empire contains an implementation of Mimikatz to gather credentials from memory.[25]

G0037 FIN6

FIN6 has used Windows Credential Editor for credential dumping.[26][27]

G0061 FIN8

FIN8 harvests credentials using Invoke-Mimikatz or Windows Credentials Editor (WCE).[28]

G0117 Fox Kitten

Fox Kitten has used prodump to dump credentials from LSASS.[29]


GALLIUM used a modified version of Mimikatz along with a PowerShell-based Mimikatz to dump credentials on the victim machines.[30][31]

S0342 GreyEnergy

GreyEnergy has a module for Mimikatz to collect Windows credentials from the victim’s machine.[32]


HAFNIUM has used procdump to dump the LSASS process memory.[33][1]

S0357 Impacket

SecretsDump and Mimikatz modules within Impacket can perform credential dumping to obtain account and password information.[34]

G0119 Indrik Spider

Indrik Spider used Cobalt Strike to carry out credential dumping using ProcDump.[35]

G0004 Ke3chang

Ke3chang has dumped credentials, including by using Mimikatz.[36][37]

G0094 Kimsuky

Kimsuky has gathered credentials using Mimikatz and ProcDump.[38][39]

S0349 LaZagne

LaZagne can perform credential dumping from memory to obtain account and password information.[40]

G0077 Leafminer

Leafminer used several tools for retrieving login and password information, including LaZagne and Mimikatz.[41]

G0065 Leviathan

Leviathan has used publicly available tools to dump password hashes, including ProcDump and WCE.[42]

S0121 Lslsass

Lslsass can dump active logon session password hashes from the lsass process.[5]

G0059 Magic Hound

Magic Hound stole domain credentials from Microsoft Active Directory Domain Controller and leveraged Mimikatz.[43]

S0002 Mimikatz

Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from the LSASS Memory.[44][45][46][47]

G0069 MuddyWater

MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with Mimikatz and procdump64.exe.[48][49][50]

S0056 Net Crawler

Net Crawler uses credential dumpers such as Mimikatz and Windows Credential Editor to extract cached credentials from Windows systems.[20]

S0368 NotPetya

NotPetya contains a modified version of Mimikatz to help gather credentials that are later used for lateral movement.[51][52][47]

G0049 OilRig

OilRig has used credential dumping tools such as Mimikatz to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system and to Outlook Web Access.[53][54][43][55]

S0439 Okrum

Okrum was seen using MimikatzLite to perform credential dumping.[56]

S0365 Olympic Destroyer

Olympic Destroyer contains a module that tries to obtain credentials from LSASS, similar to Mimikatz. These credentials are used with PsExec and Windows Management Instrumentation to help the malware propagate itself across a network.[57]

G0116 Operation Wocao

Operation Wocao has used ProcDump to dump credentials from memory.[58]


PLATINUM has used keyloggers that are also capable of dumping credentials.[59]

S0428 PoetRAT

PoetRAT used voStro.exe, a compiled pypykatz (Python version of Mimikatz), to steal credentials.[60]

S0378 PoshC2

PoshC2 contains an implementation of Mimikatz to gather credentials from memory.[61]

S0194 PowerSploit

PowerSploit contains a collection of Exfiltration modules that can harvest credentials using Mimikatz.[62][63]

S0192 Pupy

Pupy can execute Lazagne as well as Mimikatz using PowerShell.[64]

S0583 Pysa

Pysa can perform OS credential dumping using Mimikatz.[65]

G0034 Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team's plainpwd tool is a modified version of Mimikatz and dumps Windows credentials from system memory.[66][67]

G0091 Silence

Silence has used the Farse6.1 utility (based on Mimikatz) to extract credentials from lsass.exe.[68]

G0088 TEMP.Veles

TEMP.Veles has used Mimikatz and a custom tool, SecHack, to harvest credentials. [69]

G0027 Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 actors have used a modified version of Mimikatz called Wrapikatz to dump credentials. They have also dumped credentials from domain controllers.[70][71]

G0107 Whitefly

Whitefly has used Mimikatz to obtain credentials.[72]

S0005 Windows Credential Editor

Windows Credential Editor can dump credentials.[73]


ID Mitigation Description
M1040 Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to secure LSASS and prevent credential stealing. [74]

M1043 Credential Access Protection

With Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping. It is not configured by default and has hardware and firmware system requirements. It also does not protect against all forms of credential dumping.[75][76]

M1028 Operating System Configuration

Consider disabling or restricting NTLM.[77] Consider disabling WDigest authentication.[78]

M1027 Password Policies

Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network.

M1026 Privileged Account Management

Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers.

M1025 Privileged Process Integrity

On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, enable Protected Process Light for LSA.[79]

M1017 User Training

Limit credential overlap across accounts and systems by training users and administrators not to use the same password for multiple accounts.


ID Data Source Data Component
DS0017 Command Command Execution
DS0009 Process OS API Execution
Process Access
Process Creation

Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with LSASS.exe.[80] Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access LSASS.exe by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective Process Injection to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.

On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.

Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,[81] which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.


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