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Screen Capture

Adversaries may use screen captures to collect information about applications running in the foreground, capture user data, credentials, or other sensitive information. Applications running in the background can capture screenshots or videos of another application running in the foreground by using the Android MediaProjectionManager (generally requires the device user to grant consent).[1][2] Background applications can also use Android accessibility services to capture screen contents being displayed by a foreground application.[3] An adversary with root access or Android Debug Bridge (adb) access could call the Android screencap or screenrecord commands.[4][5]

ID: T1513
Sub-techniques:  No sub-techniques
Tactic Type: Post-Adversary Device Access
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Tactic: Collection
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Platforms: Android
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MTC ID: APP-40
Version: 1.1
Created: 08 August 2019
Last Modified: 24 June 2020
Provided by LAYER 8

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0422 Anubis

Anubis can take screenshots.[6]
S0655 BusyGasper

BusyGasper can use its keylogger module to take screenshots of the area of the screen that the user tapped.[7]
S0479 DEFENSOR ID

DEFENSOR ID can abuse the accessibility service to read any text displayed on the screen.[8]
S0478 EventBot

EventBot can abuse Android’s accessibility service to capture data from installed applications.[9]
S0405 Exodus

Exodus Two can take screenshots of any application in the foreground.[10]

S0408 FlexiSpy

FlexiSpy can take screenshots of other applications.[11]

S0423 Ginp

Ginp can capture device screenshots and stream them back to the C2.[12]
S0551 GoldenEagle

GoldenEagle has taken screenshots.[13]
S0421 GolfSpy

GolfSpy can take screenshots.[14]
S0485 Mandrake

Mandrake can record the screen.[15]
S0407 Monokle

Monokle can record the screen as the user unlocks the device and can take screenshots of any application in the foreground. Monokle can also abuse accessibility features to read the screen to capture data from a large number of popular applications.[3]
S0324 SpyDealer

SpyDealer abuses Accessibility features to steal messages from popular apps such as WeChat, Skype, Viber, and QQ.[16]
S0558 Tiktok Pro

Tiktok Pro can take screenshots.[17]
S0427 TrickMo

TrickMo can use the MediaRecorder class to record the screen when the targeted application is presented to the user, and can abuse accessibility features to record targeted applications to intercept transaction authorization numbers (TANs) and to scrape on-screen text.[18]
S0489 WolfRAT

WolfRAT can record the screen and take screenshots to capture messages from Line, Facebook Messenger, and WhatsApp.[19]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1013 Application Developer Guidance

Application developers can apply FLAG_SECURE to sensitive screens within their apps to make it more difficult for the screen contents to be captured.[20]
M1005 Application Vetting

Applications can be vetted for their use of the Android MediaProjectionManager class, with extra scrutiny applied to any application that uses the class.
M1012 Enterprise Policy

Enterprise policies should block access to the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) by preventing users from enabling USB debugging on Android devices unless specifically needed (e.g., if the device is used for application development). An EMM/MDM can use the Android DevicePolicyManager.setPermittedAccessibilityServices method to set an explicit list of applications that are allowed to use Android's accessibility features.
M1011 User Guidance

Users should be advised not to grant consent for screen captures to occur unless expected. Users should avoid enabling USB debugging (Android Debug Bridge) unless explicitly required.

Detection

The user can view a list of apps with accessibility service privileges in the device settings.

References

  1. Dario Durando. (2019, July 3). BianLian: A New Wave Emerges. Retrieved September 4, 2019.
  2. Android Developers. (n.d.). Android MediaProjectionManager. Retrieved August 8, 2019.
  3. Bauer A., Kumar A., Hebeisen C., et al. (2019, July). Monokle: The Mobile Surveillance Tooling of the Special Technology Center. Retrieved September 4, 2019.
  4. Android Developers. (n.d.). Android Debug Bridge (adb). Retrieved August 8, 2019.
  5. Zhang, V. (2015, July 21). Hacking Team RCSAndroid Spying Tool Listens to Calls; Roots Devices to Get In. Retrieved August 8, 2019.
  6. M. Feller. (2020, February 5). Infostealer, Keylogger, and Ransomware in One: Anubis Targets More than 250 Android Applications. Retrieved April 8, 2020.
  7. Alexey Firsh. (2018, August 29). BusyGasper – the unfriendly spy. Retrieved October 1, 2021.
  8. L. Stefanko. (2020, May 22). Insidious Android malware gives up all malicious features but one to gain stealth. Retrieved June 26, 2020.
  9. D. Frank, L. Rochberger, Y. Rimmer, A. Dahan. (2020, April 30). EventBot: A New Mobile Banking Trojan is Born. Retrieved June 26, 2020.
  10. Security Without Borders. (2019, March 29). Exodus: New Android Spyware Made in Italy. Retrieved September 3, 2019.
  1. FlexiSpy. (n.d.). FlexiSpy Monitoring Features. Retrieved September 4, 2019.
  2. ThreatFabric. (2019, November). Ginp - A malware patchwork borrowing from Anubis. Retrieved April 8, 2020.
  3. A. Kumar, K. Del Rosso, J. Albrecht, C. Hebeisen. (2020, June 1). Mobile APT Surveillance Campaigns Targeting Uyghurs - A collection of long-running Android tooling connected to a Chinese mAPT actor. Retrieved November 10, 2020.
  4. E. Xu, G. Guo. (2019, June 28). Mobile Cyberespionage Campaign ‘Bouncing Golf’ Affects Middle East. Retrieved January 27, 2020.
  5. R. Gevers, M. Tivadar, R. Bleotu, A. M. Barbatei, et al.. (2020, May 14). Uprooting Mandrake: The Story of an Advanced Android Spyware Framework That Went Undetected for 4 Years. Retrieved July 15, 2020.
  6. Wenjun Hu, Cong Zheng and Zhi Xu. (2017, July 6). SpyDealer: Android Trojan Spying on More Than 40 Apps. Retrieved September 18, 2018.
  7. S. Desai. (2020, September 8). TikTok Spyware. Retrieved January 5, 2021.
  8. P. Asinovsky. (2020, March 24). TrickBot Pushing a 2FA Bypass App to Bank Customers in Germany. Retrieved April 24, 2020.
  9. W. Mercer, P. Rascagneres, V. Ventura. (2020, May 19). The wolf is back... . Retrieved July 20, 2020.
  10. Nightwatch Cybersecurity. (2016, April 13). Research: Securing Android Applications from Screen Capture (FLAG_SECURE). Retrieved November 5, 2019.