Gather Victim Identity Information: Credentials

Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.

Adversaries may gather credentials from potential victims in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect website authentication cookies from visitors.[1] Credential information may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Engines, breach dumps, code repositories, etc.).[2][3][4][5][6][7][8] Adversaries may also purchase credentials from dark web or other black-markets. Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Valid Accounts).

Law Assessment

Article Assessment
None assessed
There could be an assessment of a subtechnique.

Forensics

Forensic Domain Assessment
None assessed
There could be a forensic assessment of a subtechnique.
ID: T1589.001
Sub-technique of:  T1589
Tactic: Reconnaissance
Platforms: PRE
Contributors: Lee Christensen, SpecterOps; Toby Kohlenberg; Vinayak Wadhwa, Lucideus
Version: 1.0
Created: 02 October 2020
Last Modified: 15 April 2021
Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch (StGB)
Relevant Articles:

Relevant Forensic Domains:


Provided by LAYER 8

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0007 APT28

APT28 has harvested user's login credentials.[9]

G0114 Chimera

Chimera has collected credentials for the target organization from previous breaches for use in brute force attacks.[10]

G0065 Leviathan

Leviathan has collected compromised credentials to use for targeting efforts.[11]

G0059 Magic Hound

Magic Hound gathered credentials from two victims that they then attempted to validate across 75 different websites.[12]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1056 Pre-compromise

This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties.

Detection

Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.

References