| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1608.001 | Upload Malware |
| T1608.002 | Upload Tool |
| T1608.003 | Install Digital Certificate |
| T1608.004 | Drive-by Target |
| T1608.005 | Link Target |
Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable Ingress Tool Transfer by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.
Malware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary (Acquire Infrastructure) or was otherwise compromised by them (Compromise Infrastructure). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin.[1]
Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub). By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via User Execution. Masquerading may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G0050 | APT32 |
APT32 has hosted malicious payloads in Dropbox, Amazon S3, and Google Drive for use during targeting.[1] |
| G0139 | TeamTNT |
TeamTNT has uploaded backdoored Docker images to Docker Hub.[2] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1056 | Pre-compromise |
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. |
| ID | Data Source | Data Component |
|---|---|---|
| DS0035 | Internet Scan | Response Content |
If infrastructure or patterns in malware have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged malware to make it accessible for targeting.
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as User Execution or Ingress Tool Transfer.