Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Enterprise | T1071 | .001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | |
.002 | Application Layer Protocol: File Transfer Protocols | |||
Enterprise | T1547 | .001 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
NOKKI has established persistence by writing the payload to the Registry key |
Enterprise | T1074 | .001 | Data Staged: Local Data Staging |
NOKKI can collect data from the victim and stage it in |
Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | ||
Enterprise | T1070 | .004 | Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion | |
Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | ||
Enterprise | T1056 | .004 | Input Capture: Credential API Hooking |
NOKKI uses the Windows call SetWindowsHookEx and begins injecting it into every GUI process running on the victim's machine.[1] |
Enterprise | T1036 | .005 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location |
NOKKI is written to %LOCALAPPDATA%\MicroSoft Updatea\svServiceUpdate.exe prior being executed in a new process in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate folder and file.[1] |
Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | ||
Enterprise | T1218 | .011 | Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 | |
Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery |
NOKKI can gather information on drives and the operating system on the victim’s machine.[1] |
|
Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | ||
Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery |
NOKKI can collect the username from the victim’s machine.[1] |
|
Enterprise | T1124 | System Time Discovery |
NOKKI can collect the current timestamp of the victim's machine.[1] |
ID | Name | References |
---|---|---|
G0094 | Kimsuky |